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DEEDS-TESTAMENTARY CHARACT-ER-In 1929 J. J. Coulter and wife
signed, acknowledged, and delivered to be recorded an instrument granting in
customary form certain described land to their daughter, Eliza Coulter. The
instrument then recited, "It is understood between the parties hereto that the
grantors are to· have the possession, control and occupancy of said lands during
their natural life, and at their death the title to said lands shall vest in the said
Eliza Coulter, but not until the death of both grantors herein, does the title
pass." The present action, presumably instituted after the death of the makers,
-sought constructibn of the instrument.1 From a determination that the instrument was a deed, one D. W. Coulter appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Held, the instrument is testamentary in character and must be authenticated and
probated as a will. Two justices dissented. Coulter v. Carter, (Miss. I 946) 26
S. (2d) 344.
.
The necessity for classifying a given instrument as a deed or as a will may
arise because of the requirement of delivery of a deed2 or of probate of a will,8 or

1 The published report does not indicate the legal interests which the litigants in
the case claimed in the property.
2 Gibson v. Dymon, 281 Mich. 137, 274 N.W. 739 (1937).
8 2 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed.,§ 566 (1941).

1 947

J

RECENT D~CISIONS

915

of the use of the word "heirs" to pass a fee in a deed.4 Again, the problem may
arise under a statute giving to the spouse of a decedent an estate defeasible by
deed but not by will, 5 or because of an effort on the part of the maker to revoke
the instrument, 6 or because of a difference in the formal requirements prescribed by statute for the execution of the two types of instruments. 7 The
formula almost invariably proposed in determining the nature of the instrument is the legal effect contemplated by the maker, rather than the form employed by the draftsman. The instrument is construed to be a deed if it purports to create some existing interest in the transferee, even though the maker
reserves a life estate or otherwise postpones the vesting in enjoyment of the transferee's estate until the maker's death. 8 On the other hand, if the instrument
does not pass any interest until the death of the maker, it is considered a will.9
The apparent simplicity of this test belies the difficulty of its application. It has
been held that reservation of a power to revoke a present interest does not compel classification as a will an instrument otherwise operative as a deed. 10 It will
be seen that the extension of this holding to future estates vesting in enjoyment at
the death of the makep would render deeds and wills indistinguishable by the
above test.11 It would seem that where the maker stated "this instrument to
take effect only on my death," or "title to pass only on my death," the law as
above stated would invalidate every instrument executed as a deed which did not
also conform to the requirements of the Statute of Wills.12 Many courts, however, perhaps impressed with the social utility of a device which transmits small
estates at the death of the owner without the delays and expenses of probate,
construe such instruments as deeds reserving a life estate to the maker, construing "title" to mean "possession." 13 The transferee is thus regarded as
3 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed.,§ 1088 (1941).
Newman v. Dore; 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937).
8 I PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed.,§ 71 (1941).
1 Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924).
The reason for raising the question in the principal case is nowhere clearly stated,
although the majority opinion suggests that authentication or probate requirements
necessitated the determination. The dissenting opinions, construing the instrument as a
deed, assume that the holding of the court results in the nullification of the instrument.
8 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed.,§ 1070 (1939).
9 Ibid.
10 Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed.,§ 1071 (1939).
11 For a criticism of this doctrinal approach see Gulliver and Tilson, "Classification
of Gratuitous Transfers," 51 YALE L. J. l (1941), where it is proposed that the result
should vary according to the reason for raising the question. Where the transferor has
attempted to avoid some policy of the state, a strict construction is suggested. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937). But where the occasion for
classification is the difference between statutory formal requirements for the execution
of deeds and wills, a construction favoring validity is advocated on the theory that
either group of requirements is adequate safeguard against fraud. The argument· is
especially persuasive in the present case where the challenged instrument apparently was
on the public records for twenty-five years--a circumstance not usually associated with
forged conveyances.
12 Cases reaching this result are Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491, 88 S.W. (2d)
12 (1935), and Mims v. Williams, 192 Miss. 866, 7 S. {2d) 822 (1942).
18 Stubblefield v. Haywood, 123 Miss. 480, 86 S. 295 (1920); Reynolds v.
4
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having received a present interest in a future estate. So far has this sympathetic
attitude toward the inexpert draftsman gone in doubtful cases, that it has been
proposf,d that the transferee's estate be classed as an executory limitation rather
than as a vested remainder to obviate an action for waste by the transferee
against a maker who has declared in his grant that it is to have no effect during
his life.14 In the principal case the result reached by the majority seems unfortunate. Where, as here, the makers have apparently regarded the instrument
as a deed, have expressly reserved only the "possession, control and occupancy"
to themselves for their lives,lli and have further indicated the :finalin, with which
they regard the transaction 'by placing the instrument on the public records
to preclude any future contrary disposition of the property,1 6 the instrument
should be construed to be a deed. The ~ajority of· the court, in dis.regarding
these factors, ascribes to the term "title" an inflexibility which is probably not
necessitated by the history of the term in American law.17
James R. Bliss, S.Ed.

Balding, 183 Ark. 397, 36 S.W. (2d) 402 (1931); Shackleton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616
{1877); Barnett v. Barnett, 283 Ky. 710, 142 S.W. (2d) 975 (1940).
· H KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 158b and 159 (1905). The same result, except perhaps as to dower rights, could be reached by implying the reservation to be
without impeachment of waste, where the estate is not specifically reserved. See Ballantine, "When Are Deeds Testamentary?" 18 M1cH. L. REV. 470 (1920).
111 Thus, in a sense, the makers define the word "title" which follows this reservation•.'
.
18 See Pelt v. Dockery, 176 Ark. 418, 2 S.W. (2d) 62 (1928).
17 For examples of varying shades of meaning of the term, see 41 WORDS AND
P.HRASES 663 to 679.

